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FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF HEALTH
CARE EXPENDITURES: IS IT PART OF
THE HEALTH CARE PROBLEM?
PAUL J. DONAHUE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Seeking solutions to social problems is always difficult; some
problems are probably impossible to solve within the social
context in which they are embedded. Health care reform provides
a ready example. Access to health care has been an acknowl-
edged problem probably as long as health care has been provided
at a price by members of a learned profession. Despite calls for
a comprehensive solution to the problem of access at levels as
* The author is a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries and a lawyer in
Hartford, Connecticut. When this Article was written, the author worked in
the Health Section of the Law Department of Aetna Life and Casualty.
The author expresses his thanks to Professor Michael J. Graetz, Justus
S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School, who commented on earlier
drafts of this Article. Professor Graetz's comments led to significant improve-
ments. Unfortunately, the author cannot claim entirely to have persuaded
Professor Graetz of the correctness of the Article's recommendations. The
paper grew out of a course, "Reforming Public Institutions: Health Care
Reform," offered by Professors Graetz and Jerry Mashaw at the Yale Law
School during the academic year 1992-93, which the author was graciously
permitted to audit. He is grateful to the Yale Law School, Professors Graetz
and Mashaw, and to Aetna for making his participation possible.
The author also wishes to thank Professor Edward A. Zelinsky of
Benjamin Cardozo Law School. Professor Zelinsky read an earlier draft and
suggested major organizational improvements that have made the Article more
comprehensible.
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high as the presidency and as early as President Truman,'
negative public attitudes toward "socialized" health care and
opposition from the medical profession doomed the earlier pro-
posals for guaranteed access through a program of national
health insurance. 2
However, concern over the cost of health care has galvanized
efforts to reform the nation's health care system in a way that
concern over access by itself never succeeded in doing. During
the 1980s, health care costs skyrocketed in relation to other
costs of living, and the increasing costs decreased access. Access
to health care thus provides the necessary social objective of a
struggle in which the principal objective is to cuf costs.
A. Relics of Past Reform Efforts
Important elements of the contemporary American health care
matrix have their origins in earlier attempts to address the
problems of access to health care. Concern about access may
have sparked the otherwise questionable decisions of the World
War II Wage and Price Control Board and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). The Board permitted employers to provide health
care coverage to their employees without including such costs
in wages subject to control. 3 The IRS determined that employer
contributions to health care plans were not taxable income to
the employees covered by them. 4 These decisions led both to a
1. President Truman advocated a pending bill in Congress for national
health insurance in his January 1948 State of the Union address. David
Blumenthal, Medicare: The Beginnings, in RENEWING THE PROMISE: MEDICARE
AND ITS REFORM 5 (David Blumenthal et al. eds., 1988). Former President
Theodore Roosevelt proposed a program of national health insurance while
running in 1912 for President as the candidate of the Progressive Party. Id.
at 4.
2. Id. at 4-8; see generally Paul Starr, Transformation in Defeat: The
Changing Objectives of National Health Insurance, 1915-1980, in COMPULSORY
HEALTH INSURANCE 115 (Ronald L. Numbers ed., 1982) (providing historical
background of health care reform).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
WAR LABOR BOARD: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND WAGE STABILIZATION IN WAR-
TIME 308-09 & n.3 (1942-45).
4. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 66,294 (Aug. 26, 1943); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 66,326
(Oct. 26, 1943).
Emanuel L. Gordon argued that it would have been unreasonable to
include health care contributions in the employee income of ordinary workers:
How realistic is it to say that a family head earning $35 to $70
per week receives psychological income when he and his family
are provided with medical care and hospitalization? In the absence
of such benefits, he or his dependents would ordinarily go without
care or become charity cases for all or most of the benefits. These
in-kind medical benefits are provided for employees preciselyhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanl w/vol46/iss1/9
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rapid expansion in employer-funded health care' and to the
linkage of health care coverage with employment. This linkage
is one of the most dominant, yet theoretically inappropriate,
characteristics of the current health care environment.6
Another relic is the tax-exempt status of non-profit hospitals.
The status derives from the hospitals' origins as charity insti-
tutions providing care without charge to those too poor to
receive care at home from their private physicians.7 Today, non-
profit hospitals provide no more in the way of charity care than
their for-profit competitors, but their privileged tax status per-
sists despite the disappearance of the historical justification. 8
Like most tax breaks, however, the non-profit hospital exemp-
tion does not lack its ardent defenders.9
B. Importance of Political Considerations
Concern for access also led to the last major American health
care reform, the introduction of Medicare in 1965.10 The history
of the adoption of Medicare provides important lessons for
because they could not provide them for their families. Is a concept
developed to take care of the taxpayer with a large, surplus income
suitable to the intelligent taxation of the marginal taxpayer, i.e.,
one who just manages to struggle along? It would scarcely appear
that it is: first, because the marginal taxpayer, in fact, receives no
additional income; second, because a disproportionate increase in
the taxes of low income groups, which would result, is socially
undesirable.
Emanuel L. Gordon, Tax Effects of Union Welfare Funds, 6 TAx. L. Rv.
1, 51 (1950). This analysis crudely foreshadows some aspects of the argument
of Professor Andrews. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. What
medical care contributions ought to be included in income is debatable. Early
coverage was generally fixed-dollar hospital coverage, which comes close to
providing a benefit that offsets only differences in health status, not differences
in personal preferences. Andrews believes that benefits of this type are properly
excludible from income. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
5. Gordon, supra note 4, at 1-3, nn.6-7. According to Gordon, the reason
that fringe benefits were exempt from wage controls is that they were regarded
as less inflationary than wage increases. Id. at 1.
6. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
7. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 867 (1980).
8. Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organ-
izations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 57 n.16 (1981)
(discussing "commercial" nonprofit nursing homes).
9. See infra note 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of state
non-profit hospital reform measures.
10. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
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advocates of health care reform." There are several critical
elements in explaining the Medicare program that was actually
enacted. First, advocates of a broader program of national
health insurance failed to make its adoption a realistic political
possibility. Second, the American Medical Association and in-
dividual providers proved powerful lobbyists. Third, advocates
faced the deep-seated American aversion to an expansion of the
role of government. "Socialized medicine" was to be resisted
as a large opening wedge in the movement away from traditional
American values of free markets and self-reliance toward Soviet-
style communism. 2 This ideological characterization gained added
force because of the geopolitical competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Further, and most decisively with
respect to the timing of enactment, medical care for the aged
was an issue both in the 1964 presidential election and in many
congressional races. The Democrats' landslide victories at both
levels gave them a mandate that made the adoption of some
program inevitable. The conflict then progressed to the content
of the program.' 3
Another important consideration in the health care debate is
the role of small business in American political life. Small
business, which includes family farms, has a powerful appeal
to all Americans based on ideology and nationalism. Small
business is an example of individual enterprise, and the value
Americans place on both individualism and the entrepreneurial
venture is formidable. Furthermore, recent job growth in the
private sector of the economy has come almost entirely from
small business.' 4 Thus, the voices of small businesses and their
associations sound loudly in Washington's corridors of power.
Small business strongly opposes legislation requiring employers
to provide health care coverage for their employees." Among
11. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 15-18; Starr, supra note 2, at 129-
38.
12. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 5-6, 11-15; Theodore R. Marmor,
Reflections on Medicare, 13 J. MED. & PHIL. 5, 6-10 (1988).
13. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 10; Marmor, supra note 12, at 9-10.
14. See, e.g., Paul Merrion, No Respect: Why Washington Turns its Back
on Small Firms; Entrepreneurs' Agenda Clashes with Big Interests, CRAIN'S
CM. Bus., Nov. 16, 1992, at SB48; Pete Silas, Job-Creating Firms Come in
All Sizes, INDUS. WK., June 21, 1993, at 42.
15. Mary F. Kelley, a board member of the National Federation of
Independent Businesses (NFIB), attended a July 21, 1993 meeting with Pres-
ident Clinton. Discussing the meeting with reporters, Kelley said that the
attendees shared with the President their deep reservations about mandating
employer health care coverage for employees. The group emphasized the threat
to the creation of new jobs. Kelley said that she could not imagine that NFIB
would support employer mandates in any form and that the organizationhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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the public at large, support for mandating employer health care
coverage of employees falls from fifty-two to thirty percent
when one introduces the specter of job loss into the debate. 16
From the perspective of employers not currently providing
health care, there is little real difference between: (1) a require-
ment that employers provide and pay for employee health care;
and (2) a tax on those same employers used to fund government
provision of health care for otherwise uncovered employees. 7
From the perspective of Congress, however, an employer man-
date substantially increases access to health care without adding
to "on budget" government revenues or expenditures. This
approach lessens the chances that consumer opposition to in-
creased taxes on individuals will torpedo health care reform.
An employer mandate with subsidies for small business might
win the support of some small business lobbying groups, or at
least mute their opposition. 8 Even if small business groups
strongly oppose all employer mandates, a plan with employer
subsidies might appear to consumers as sufficiently fair to small
business to allow its passage.
would lobby strongly against such a proposal if it was sent to Congress. Small
Businesses Warn Clinton of Adverse Impact of Employer Mandate, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAiIY, July 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BNAHCD File. See also Steven Greenhouse, Small-Business Group in No
Mood to Relent on Opposition to Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993,
at A20.
16. Public Willing to Pay Higher Taxes for Combination Reform Plan,
BNA PENSIONS & BErEFIs DAILY, Dec. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BNAPBD File [hereinafter Combination Reform Plan].
17. According to the General Accounting Office, about three-fourths of
the 34 million uninsured Americans are workers or their dependents. GAO
Says Universal Access to Health Insurance "Achievable Goal, " 93 TAx NOTES
TODAY 12-70, Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNT
File. An enforceable employer mandate would by itself take a giant step
toward solving the access problem. Of uninsured workers, just over one-half
are employed by firms with fewer than 25 employees. Id. It is clear that
providing health care coverage that meets specified minimum standards for so
many would substantially increase the costs for businesses in this size segment,
which explains the strength of the opposition of small business to an employer
mandate.
18. In testimony before the House Small Business Committee, represen-
tatives of the Small Business Legislative Council, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and National Small
Business United, while declining to endorse an employer mandate, nevertheless
significantly qualified their opposition to a plan for employer premium con-
tributions with subsidies for lower paid workers and their employers. The
opposition of other groups remained unabated. Small Business Groups Divided
Over Employer Mandate Proposal, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Aug. 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAHCD File.
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C. The Lessons of the 1992 Election and the 1993 Budget
Debate
The primary battleground of the 1992 election was the state
of the economy. Fearful of losing its focus, the Clinton cam-
paign team repeatedly reminded itself that "It's the economy,
stupid." This simple phrase reflected widespread dissatisfaction
among middle-class Americans about their recent economic pro-
gress and about their, and their children's, prospects for the
future. Anxiety about the costs of health care, and the possibility
that employment changes might leave them without health care
coverage, made health care reform a part of the larger concern
about the economy, as well as one of the campaign's more
important issues in its own right.
Perhaps next behind the economy in overall importance as a
1992 campaign concern was the budget deficit. 9 The initially
favorable and eventually mixed reception that President Clin-
ton's budget proposals received from the public showed that the
American people were serious about reducing the deficit even if
they had not yet fully accepted what must be done to reduce
it. The debate over the budget apparently indicates that the tax
increases finally enacted have at the very least exhausted the
public's willingness to accept additional new taxes even for
popular proposals such as health care reform.
D. Ideal Health Care Reform
The theoretically ideal reform tends to differ substantially
from the politically attainable reform. Among tax policy ana-
lysts, there is widespread agreement on the theoretically ideal
health care reform. However, several features of the ideal, or
normative, health care reform emerge almost automatically from
the descriptions of current tax provisions and of the health care
economy and from the normative discussion of health care
taxation.
The broad contours of ideal health care reform are as follows.
Normative reform would include an individual, but not an
19. A poll conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute and The
Gallup Organization, Inc. asked Americans what issue should be President
Clinton's first priority in office. Thirty-seven percent of Americans responded
that Clinton should focus on improving the economy, 24% said reducing the
federal deficit, and 15% said reforming the health care system. When asked
what should be the second priority, 25% indicated reforming the health care
system, 24% said improving the economy, and 20% said reducing the budget
deficit. Carolyn Piucci, Public Attitudes on Health Care Reform Results of
New EBRI/Gallup Survey, 14:4 NoTEs 6 (Employee Benefit Research Institute
ed., Apr. 1993).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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employer, mandate. Any subsidies required would be provided
to individuals on the basis of their income. The reform would
continue full deductibility of employer contributions to employee
health care coverage as a form of compensation. The reform
would cap, or eliminate altogether, the exclusion of employer
contributions from employee income. 20 It would end the tax-
exempt status of nonprofit health care providers and their
eligibility for tax-exempt bond financing. Finally, health care
reform would include increases in the excise taxes on alcohol
and tobacco sufficient to recover the health care costs of their
use.
Analysts differ on the potential for approximating this ideal.
Pragmatic advocates of health care reform should not lose sight
of the economic principles that make health care reform nec-
essary. While they attempt to fashion a reform proposal that
Congress can enact and the President will sign, they must also
seek to assure that the proposal departs as little as possible from
the theoretical ideal.
Fashioning such a proposal is the goal of this Article. Part
II of the Article describes the existing Internal Revenue Code
20. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, A Tax Reform Strategy to Deal with the
Uninsured, 265 JAMA 2541, 2542-43 (1991) (advocating an individual mandate,
refundable tax credits, and elimination of the employer-provided health insur-
ance exclusion); Michael J. Graetz, The Big Health Reform Mistake: Man-
dating Employer Coverage, 2 DoMEsTIC Am'. 79, 98 (1993) (favoring the
phasing out of the employer-provided health insurance exclusion in favor of
a voucher for health insurance purchases); Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for
'Responsible National Health Insurance,' 10 HEALTH AFF. 5, 11-12 (1991)
(advocating elimination of exclusions in favor of refundable tax credits).
A proposal to cap the non-inclusion of employer contributions to the cost
of employee medical coverage was part of the Treasury Department's 1984
recommendations to President Reagan for overall tax reform. The report
succinctly set forth the major policy reasons for supporting a cap. See 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF TREAS., TAX RFnFoi FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND GROWTH: THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 73 (1984) [hereinafter TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNEss]; 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS at 23-24. The proposal
was also part of the 1985 fiscal budget submitted by President Reagan. 1 TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS at 73. The proposal encountered fierce resistance,
especially from the insurance industry. See ACLI/HIAA JOINT TASK FORCE
ON THE TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, REviEw AND ANALYSIS OF THE
TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (1985).
Attitudes have changed substantially since then. Only organized labor ap-
pears to oppose a tax cap. Business leaders have begun to speak in favor of
a cap. The insurance industry has been largely silent. See Laurie McGinley,
Tax-Break Cap On Health Plans Gains Support, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1992,
at BI (citing Business Roundtable committee recommendation that endorsed
taxing some health care benefits). See also Hilary Stout, Benefits-Taxation
Idea Returns to White House Under Clinton After Failing as a Bush Proposal,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1992, at A30 (citing President-elect Clinton's inclination
to limit tax breaks for employee health benefits).
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treatment of health care expenditures, and Part III provides an
analysis of health care economics. Part IV discusses how the
existing tax code provisions conform to those that sound tax
policy would demand in light of the realities of the health care
economy. Part V analyzes normative reform and the reasons
why a close approximation is not politically attainable. Part V
then articulates a "second best" proposal for reform with a
greater potential for enactment, and explains how it differs from
provisions of the Clinton Plan.
The heart of this pragmatic proposal is both a dual employer/
individual mandate and a dual system of employer/individual
tax credits. The analysis freely concedes that this is a more
complex system than the theoretically ideal system would be. Its
admitted purpose is to prevent the objections of small business
from defeating a sound proposal for reform, while at the same
time making the proposal acceptable to the general public.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
REGULATIONS
A. Section 213 and Individual Medical Expenses
The touchstone for all other sections of the Internal Revenue
Code (the Code) pertaining to health care is section 213.21
Standing alone, section 213 allows a deduction for medical
expenses of a taxpayer, and of the taxpayer's spouse or de-
pendent, which have not been reimbursed by another party (e.g.,
an employer-provided health plan).22 The deduction applies to
the extent those expenses exceed 7.5 percent of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income.Y
Section 213 is surprising both for its parsimony at one end
of the medical expense cost spectrum and its expansiveness at
the other. It prohibits a deduction for amounts spent on over-
21. I.R.C. § 213 (Law. Co-op. 1993). Section references without further
description are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended, 26 U.S.C.S.
(Law. Co-op. 1993).
22. I.R.C. § 213(a). This subsection provides:
ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION - There shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion the expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer,
his spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section 152), to the
extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross
income.
Id.
23. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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the-counter medications.2 Otherwise, the section's definition of
medical care is very expansive. "Medical care" encompasses
"amounts paid ... for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body," including insurance and
transportation expenses necessary to obtain medical care. 2
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) explicitly authorizes a
medical expense deduction for amounts paid to qualified and
authorized psychologists.Y The IRS also states that payments
may be deductible even if made to unlicensed practitioners, as
long as the treatment is not illegal: "The determination of what
is medical care depends on the nature of the services rendered,
not on the experience, qualifications, or title of the person
rendering them." '27
Section 213(d)(2) extends the deduction to lodging expenses
"primarily for and essential to" medical care provided by a
physician in a hospital.Y However, section 213(d)(9), added in
1990, excepts from eligibility for deduction any procedure aimed
at improving appearance which does not "meaningfully promote
the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or
disease." ' 29 This exclusion, aimed at cosmetic surgery, appears
not to extend to purely cosmetic prescription drugs, such as
Retin-A or Rogaine.30 There are otherwise no limits on the type
or amount of medical expenses eligible for deduction.
The Internal Revenue Code provides no special treatment for
health insurance payments by individuals on their own behalf.
Instead, individual insurance premiums qualify along with other
out-of-pocket medical expenditures for possible deduction as
medical expenses under section 213.31
24. Section 213(b) provides:
LIMrTATION WITH RESPECT TO MEDICINE AND DRUGS - An amount
paid during the taxable year for medicine or a drug shall be taken
into account under subsection (a) only if such medicine or drug
is a prescribed drug or insulin.
I.R.C. § 213(b).
25. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1).
26. 1953-2 C.B. 129, 130 (1953). See also Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B.
307, 307 (1955) (restating allowance of medical expense deduction for, inter
alia, psychologists and "authorized Christian Science practitioners").
27. 1963-91 C.B. 54, 54 (1963).
28. I.R.C. § 213(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1993). The deduction is limited to
$50 per night. Id.
29. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §
11342(a), 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified at 26 U.S.C.S. § 213(d)(9) (Law. Co-
op. 1993)).
30. See I.R.C. § 213(d)(3) (defining "prescribed drug" as any drug re-
quiring a physician's prescription); I.R.C. § 213(b), supra note 24.
31. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(C). This has not always been the case. See infra
note 67.
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Individuals also benefit from section 32(b)(2), which provides
a credit for insurance coverage that includes at least one qual-
ifying child.12 In addition, Medicare benefits are exempt from
taxation,33 even though Medicare eligibility is not based on
income and benefits are funded by pre-tax contributions and
general tax revenues as well as by employee after-tax contribu-
tions.3 4
B. Employer-Provided Health Plan Provisions
Section 105 of the Code requires inclusion in employee income
of benefits paid out by an employer health plan unless those
benefits meet the deductibility requirements under section 213.11
32. I.R.C. § 32(b)(2).
33. Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31, revoked in part, Rev. Rul. 79-173,
1979-1 C.B. 86.
34. The Congressional Budget Office explained the logic of taxing part of
the cost of the Medicare program as follows:
Eligibility for Hospital Insurance (HI) benefits is based on work-
ing-year tax contributions, half of which are paid by employees
from after-tax income and half by employers from pre-tax income.
Hence, 50 percent of the insurance value of HI benefits might be
treated as taxable income for all Medicare enrollees, reflecting the
portion of contributions that was not originally subject to income
tax. This proposal is analogous to taxing part of Social Security
benefits, which is already in effect for higher-income beneficiaries
whose modified adjusted gross income plus half of Social Security
benefits exceeds $25,000 (for individuals) or $32,000 (for couples).
In addition, that portion of the insurance value of benefits under
the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program that is not
covered by enrollees' premiums (currently about 75 percent) could
be added to their taxable income.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS
365 (1993) [hereinafter REDUCING THE DEFCrr]. The report estimated a $54.6
billion revenue increase over the period 1994-98 if both the HI and SMI taxes
are instituted without income thresholds. Id.
35. I.R.C. § 105 (Law. Co-op 1993). This section provides in relevant
part:
(a) AMOUNTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts received by
an employee through accident or health insurance for personal
injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the extent
such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the employer
which were not includible in the gross income of the employee,
or (2) are paid by the employer.
(b) AMOUNTS EXPENDED FOR MEDICAL CARE. - Except in the
case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions
allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for
any prior taxable year, gross income does not include amounts
referred to in subsection (a) if such amounts are paid, directly or
indirectly, to the taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer for expenseshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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Amounts received by employees as reimbursement for medical
expenses are thus excluded from gross income. Section 106
provides, in its entirety, that "[g]ross income of an employee
does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident
or health plan." ' 36 Treasury Regulation section 1.106-1 refers
explicitly to Code section 105(e) 37 - which dictates that self-
funded employer plans shall receive the same treatment as
insured plans - in explaining that employer contributions are
excluded from employee income.3 8
Other than the deduction provided by section 213, section
162(0 modified the rule that the self-employed could take no
deduction for individual health insurance.39 Prior to 1994, self-
incurred by him for the medical care (as defined in section 213(d))
of the taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents (as defined in
section 152). Any child to whom section 152(e) applies shall be
treated as a dependent of both parents for purposes of this
subsection.
(C) PAYMENTS UNRELATED TO ABSENCE FROM WORK. - Gross
income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a) to
the extent such amounts-
(1) constitute payment for the permanent loss or loss of use
of a member or function of the body, or the permanent disfig-
urement, of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as defined
in section 152), and(2) are computed with reference to the nature of the injury
without regard to the period the employee is absent from work.
(d) [Repealed]
(e) ACCIDENT AND HEALTH PLANS. - For purposes of this
section and section 104-
(1) amounts received under an accident or health plan for
employees, and
(2) amounts received from a sickness and disability fund for
employees maintained under the law of a State or the District of
Columbia, shall be treated as amounts received through accident
or health insurance.(f) RULES FOR APPLICATION OF SECTION 213. - For purposes of
section 213(a) (relating to medical, dental, etc., expenses) amounts
excluded from gross income under subsection (c) or (d) shall not
be considered as compensation (by insurance or otherwise) for
expenses paid for medical care.
(g) SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUAL NOT CONSIDERED AN EMPLOYEE.
- For purposes of this section, the term "employee" does not
include an individual who is an employee within the meaning of
section 401(c)(1) (relating to self-employed individuals).
I.R.C. § 105.
Section 105(h) addresses deductions by highly compensated individuals
under self-insured reimbursement plans, and § 105(i) covers sick pay received
under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.
36. I.R.C. § 106.
37. See supra note 35.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1993).
39. I.R.C. § 162(b (Law. Co-op. 1993).
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employed individuals could deduct as a business expense twenty-
five percent of the cost of medical insurance for themselves and
for their spouses and dependents. 40
Section 125(a) provides that non-discriminatory cafeteria ben-
efit plans that offer a choice between qualified benefits and cash
will not cause the choice of a qualified benefit to result in
inclusion of the value of the benefit in gross income. 4' Section
125(f) states that a qualified benefit is one eligible for exclusion
by an express provision of the Code.4 2 Proposed Regulation
section 1.125-2 Q&A 7(b)(4) provides that a health flexible
spending account can only reimburse medical expenses as defined
in section 213.43
In general, employers may deduct payments for employee
health care plan premiums as a trade or business expense under
section 162.4 Treasury Regulation section 1.162-10(a) provides,
among many other things, that amounts paid by a taxpayer
under "a sickness, accident, hospitalization, [or] medical expense
... plan, are deductible under section 162(a) if they are ordinary
and necessary expenses of the trade or business. ' ' 45
C. Charitable Hospitals
Section 501(c)(3) grants an exemption from the corporate
income tax to:
Corporations ... organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to
foster ... sports competition ... or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals ...46
The exemption in section 501(c)(3) applies only when net earn-
ings do not inure to private shareholders and when the organi-
zation does not lobby for legislation or support the campaigns
of candidates for office. 47
40. I.R.C. § 162(0(1). This deduction expired on December 31, 1993.
I.R.C. § 162(0(6). It has not yet been extended, although its possible extension
continues to be discussed.
41. I.R.C. § 125(a).
42. I.R.C. § 125(f). There are exceptions to the exclusion rule provided
by § 117 for qualified scholarships, by § 127 for educational assistance
programs, and by § 132 for certain fringe benefits. Id.
43. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2 Q&A 7(b)(4), 54 Fed. Reg. 9500, 9502-04
(1989).
44. I.R.C. § 162(a) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1993).
46. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
47. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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The IRS has interpreted this provision expansively to include
nursing homes and hospitals organized as non-profits that pro-
vide little charitable care.4 This policy abandoned an earlier
requirement that an institution provide a meaningful amount of
free or below-cost care to the poor to qualify for tax exemp-
tion. 9
[T]he Service chose to reinterpret the term "charita-
ble" so that subsidized care would no longer be re-
quired. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. A coherent
rationale for this redefinition of the exemption was
never expressed by the Service. This imaginative broad-
ening of the statutory category of "charitable" organ-
izations was challenged, but was sustained by the
Court of Appeal, in an opinion which sheds no light
of its own on the policy issues involved. 0
In addition to the provisions above aimed directly at health
care, private hospitals sometimes benefit from the use of capital
provided by means of state and local bonds exempt from federal
income tax under provisions of section 103. 51 Further, various
health care activities benefit from charitable contributions from
taxpayers, which are tax-deductible under section 170.52 Section
28 allows a tax credit for clinical testing expenses for rare
diseases . 3
D. Tax Expenditure Cost of Existing Preferences for Medical
Care
According to 1994 estimates by the staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation, the exclusion of employer contributions for
medical insurance premiums and medical care will cost $37.1
billion.54 In addition, the credit for child medical insurance
premiums will total $100 million, the deductibility of medical
48. Rev. Rul. 72-154, 1972-1 C.B. 145.
49. Hansmann, supra note 8, at 57-58 n.16 (citing Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
50. Id.
51. I.R.C. § 103(a) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
52. I.R.C. § 170(a).
53. I.R.C. § 28(a). The tax credit equals 50% of "qualified clinical testing
expenses for the taxable year." Id. This credit expired on December 31, 1993.
I.R.C. § 28(e).
54. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., IST SESS., EsTIMATEs OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FIscAL YEARS 1994-1998, at 17 (1993) [here-
inafter FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITR S]. This figure includes the U.S. government
program for military dependents, called the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).
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expenses will cost $3.5 billion, the exclusion of interest on state
and local bonds for private hospitals will equal $1.8 billion, the
deductibility of charitable contributions for health will cost $1.6
billion, and the exclusion of Medicare benefits will cost $13.1
billion." These costs yield a total of $57.2 billion, the second
largest tax expenditure behind retirement income. 6
The exemption of non-profit health care providers from the
corporate income tax is not included in the standard indices of
tax expenditures. However, the revenue loss is estimated at $2.5
billion annually.5 7
E. Conformity of the Code's Treatment of Health Care
Expenditures to General Code Principles
To assess the conformity of the Code's treatment of health
care expenditures to basic principles of income taxation, one
must be familiar with those principles. The extended and unre-
solved debate between followers of the late Stanley S. Surrey
and their critics, led by Boris Bittker, indicates that this is an
elusive goal.58
Even so, the deduction allowance to employers for health care
plan payments is completely unremarkable. Health care is a
standard, though not universal, part of employee compensation
packages. Reasonable compensation of employees is an arche-
type of the business expense deduction that must be permitted
to arrive at net income. 9
55. Id. These numbers reflect only reductions in federal income tax. They
do not reflect reductions in Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes and
they do not reflect reductions in state taxes. In testimony before the House
Ways and Means Health Subcommittee, Nancy Gordon, assistant director of
the Human Resources Division, Congressional Iudget Office, said that state
income tax provisions resulted in tax expenditures for health care in 1993 of
an additional $10 billion. Peter Jakubowicz, CBO: Employer-Provided Health
Insurance Deductions Means 'Implicit' Subsidy of $73 Million in 1993, 93
TAx NoTEs TODAY 19-6, Jan. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library,
TNT File. Further, at the state and local level, health care providers benefit
from the common exclusion from sales and use taxes of services in general
and the universal exclusion of health care services. See generally JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 749-60 (5th
ed. 1988) (discussing taxation of services).
56. This calculation assumes that each of these tax expenditures is suffi-
ciently independent so that adding them together approximates the revenue
effect of eliminating all of them.
57. Gabriel Rudney & John Copeland, End Tax Breaks for Nonprofit
Hospitals, 93 TAx NOTES TODAY 112-59, available in LEXIS, TAXANA
Library, TNT File.
58. See infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
principles of income taxation.
59. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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The Code distinguishes between business expenditures, which
are deductible, and personal expenditures, which are not.60 Ad-
mittedly, that line is sometimes difficult to draw. Professor
William D. Andrews amply demonstrated that difficulty with
respect to health care expenditures by individuals:
The appropriate role of personal deductions in an
ideal income tax base is just that - to adjust for
discrepancies between money income and real con-
sumption and accumulation resulting from expendi-
tures for items that we do not wish to take into account
as part of the aggregate personal consumption or
accumulation we wish to tax. 61
For Professor Andrews, it was appropriate to exclude from the
tax base differences in medical care consumption that reflected
differences in medical need. However, it was not appropriate to
exclude expenses that were the result of voluntary personal
gratification. 62 Under this view, a majority but not all of the
current deduction would be justified. 63
The deduction of section 213 has a parallel in the deduction
for personal casualty losses of section 165. 64 Section 165(h) limits
the deduction to the excess of the net of casualty losses each
exceeding $100 over 10 percent of the individual's adjusted gross
60. Compare I.R.C. § 162 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (allowing deductions for
business expenses) with I.R.C. § 262 (prohibiting deductions for "personal
living or family expenses").
61. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HAv. L. REv. 309, 330 (1972).
62. Id. at 336-37.
63. Professor Andrews' analysis will provide a conceptually sound basis
for evaluating the tax elements of health care reform proposals. Andrews'
remarks, which concerned only the § 213 deduction, lend themselves to much
wider application. See infra part V.B.3.
64. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1993). Section 165 of the Code provides
in relevant part:
(a) GENERAL RULE. - There shall be allowed as a deduction
any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise.
(c) LIMITATION ON LossEs OF INDIVIDUALS. - In the case of an
individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
though not connected with a trade or business; and
(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses of property
not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered
into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck,
or other casualty, or from theft.
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income.65 These sections may be viewed jointly as making the
government a partial insurer against catastrophic losses not
otherwise reimbursed. Boris Bittker defends both these deduc-
tions on basic tax principles. 6 In Bittker's view, "Casualties
undeniably reduce the taxpayer's net worth - and should there-
fore presumptively reduce his income . . . - and it is debatable
whether they are offset by the satisfactions implied by the term
'consumption."' 6 7
Non-inclusion in employee income of employer payments for
health care coverage,6 however, is an anomaly that seriously
violates the principle of taxing net income. For an employee
with covered dependents, the value of employer-provided health
care can easily be ten percent or more of total compensation.
Such a striking departure from the principle of taxation of net
income should require a very strong public policy justification.
Normative tax policy also cannot justify the exemption of
non-profit health care providers from corporate income tax. 69
The tax code discriminates among health care providers based
on organizational form. Non-profit health care providers are
exempt from federal income tax and often from state and local
taxation; for-profit health care providers are not. Assuming
arguendo that health care is over-consumed, the argument against
any tax subsidies becomes stronger.
Furthermore, providers that are granted tax advantages not
granted to others will have a competitive advantage not grounded
in efficiency of health care delivery. Tax preferences could work
against the overall goal of reform by directing consumers to less
efficient providers. Universal access will eliminate the vestiges
of providing uncompensated health care to the indigent. This
charitable aspect explains the origin of the existing exemptions.1°
But actual practice today differs little between non-governmental
65. I.R.C. § 165(h).
66. Boris Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for
Personal Expenditures, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 193 (1973).
67. Id. at 197. Bittker stated that a more cogent criticism of the casualty
deduction is that the deduction mitigates the cost of failing to take the sensible
precaution to insure. Id. at 198. The same criticism applies to § 213 in its
current form. Before 1982, § 213(a)(2) allowed a deduction of up to $150 per
year for medical insurance expenditures without dictating an income threshold
percentage. While such a provision avoids the incentive problem that Bittker
noted, it also allows a deduction for normal expenses. Bittker admitted that
this added deduction for normal expenses does not justify his rationale for
the catastrophic coverage of § 213. Id. at 198 n.12.
68. I.R.C. § 106 (Law. Co-op. 1993); see supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
69. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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non-profits and for-profit providers of health care. The existing
exemptions are an anachronism that would warrant repeal even
without any other changes to the health care system. 7' Repeal
is especially important as a prelude to a radical reconstruction
of the health care market, lest marginally less efficient providers
gain unwarranted market share.
The same "level playing field" argument requires that health
care facilities be ineligible for funding with tax-exempt bonds. 72
To allow some competitors access to lower cost capital while
depriving others of the same benefit is anti-competitive and
impedes progress toward greater efficiency in the health care
sector.
III. THE EcONOMICS OF THE HEALTH CARE MARKET
A. Market Imperfections
An efficient market requires that both buyers and sellers be
(1) willing, (2) knowledgeable, and (3) able to enjoy free access
to and exit from the market. 73 The market for health care
services74 possesses neither the second nor third of these char-
acteristics; buyers are rarely knowledgeable, and their freedom
to enter and exit the market is limited. State licensing laws limit
the entry of sellers of medical services. Further, the subjective
value consumers attach to their health adds a dimension to their
willingness to consume that distinguishes health care from other
commodities for which monetary cost is a more important
factor."
71. See Hansmann, supra note 8, at 58-62 (attempting to construct a
workable definition of income for nonprofit organizations); Hansmann, supra
note 7, at 866-68 (detailing the historical factors making hospitals typically
nonprofit).
72. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
73. DAvID L. WEIMER & AmI R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICE 30, 41-77, 266 (1992).
74. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Econom-
ics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963). This insightful article,
though old, is still extremely relevant because it explains the developments in
health care over the last 30 years. One example is Arrow's explanation of the
inherent instability of community rating, still prevalent when he wrote, if what
we would today call "experience-rating" became available. Id. at 964. Arrow's
analysis is "a catalogue of stylized generalizations about the medical-care
market which differentiate it from the usual commodity markets." Id. at 948.
75. In addition, the demand for medical services is associated, with
a considerable probability, with an assault on personal integrity.
There is some risk of death and a more considerable risk of
impairment of full functioning. In particular, there is a major
potential for loss or reduction of earning ability .... Illness is,
thus, not only risky but a costly risk in itself, apart from the cost
of medical care.
Arrow, supra note 74, at 949.
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B. Information Asymmetries
Purchasers of medical services have far less information avail-
able to them when considering the purchase of health care than
they do when they are considering the purchase of a video
cassette recorder. Price comparisons are difficult, especially be-
cause physicians generally provide their services on a fee-for-
service basis, without advertising or overt price competition,
and without quoting a price in advance.7 6 Patients cannot de-
termine the probable effects on their health caused by declining
to undergo a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) that their
physician recommends. 77 Current practice fails to provide pa-
tients with disclosure, 78 which would force providers to develop
and present health care consumers with information on the
effectiveness of recommended treatments. Current practice also
76. Id. at 949-50.
77. Uncertainty as to the quality of the product is perhaps more
intense here than in any other important commodity. Recovery
from disease is as unpredictable as is its incidence. In most
commodities, the possibility of learning from one's own experience
or that of others is strong because there is an adequate number
of trials. In the case of severe illness, that is, in general, not true;
the uncertainty due to inexperience is added to the intrinsic dif-
ficulty of prediction. Further, the amount of uncertainty, measured
in terms of utility variability, is certainly much greater for medical
care in severe cases than for, say, houses or automobiles, even
though these are also expenditures sufficiently infrequent so that
there may be considerable residual uncertainty.
Further, there is a special quality to the uncertainty; it is very
different on the two sides of the transaction. Because medical
knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed by the
physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is
necessarily very much greater than that of the patient, or at least
so it is believed by both parties. Further, both parties are aware
of this informational inequality, and their relation is colored by
this knowledge.
To avoid misunderstanding, observe that the difference in in-
formation relevant here is a difference in information as to the
consequence of a purchase of medical care.
Arrow, supra note 74, at 951.
Patients are even less likely to determine when the doctor's recommendation
is made solely for the doctor's personal enrichment. See Prime Time Live
(ABC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1993) (documenting doctors willing to refer
patients for unneeded MRIs to labs which promised the doctors kickbacks,
and the solicitation of persons on unemployment lines to submit to "consul-
tations" during which an MRI would be prescribed).
78. Some proposals for health care reform give a prominent role to
outcomes disclosure. Pennsylvania has adopted a program of disclosure that
many hope will serve as a model. See Ron Winslow, State Rates Heart
Surgeons by Mortality, WALL ST. f., Nov. 20, 1992, at BI (rating individual
doctors according to death rates as part of report on coronary bypass surgery).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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fails to provide guarantees, which often serve as substitutes for
non-disclosure of information on reliability. 79 With health and
possibly life at stake, the instinct for self-preservation makes
even informed health care consumers "willing" purchasers of
products of uncertain quality. Information asymmetries favor
consumption. Consider a diagnostic test that costs $1000. As-
sume that the patient is responsible for paying the entire cost
out-of-pocket; there is no "third-party payment." Assume that
the test has only a two percent probability of changing the
health outcome and a five percent probability of changing the
indicated treatment. The physician recommends the test.
In this hypothetical, the patient would be willing to pay $1000
for a test which has only a five percent chance of favorably
affecting her health outcome, which is to say the patient genu-
inely prefers a five percent chance of improved health to $1000.80
Thus, with full disclosure, the patient would decline to undergo
this test. However, the patient mistakenly assumes that the
physician's recommendation means that the test has at least a
five percent chance of improving her health; that is, the patient
mistakenly assumes that the physician's decision criterion is no
lower than the patient's own. Information asymmetries like these
lie at the heart of what is sometimes called "physician-induced
demand."
Assume instead that the test does have a five percent proba-
bility of improving the patient's health but that the physician
did not consider the test sufficiently probative. The physician
does not mention the test to the patient. The patient would not
know enough to ask for it, even though the patient would freely
have chosen to undergo the test and pay for it if the physician
had discussed and fully disclosed its limitations. Because the
patient's decision to undergo the test is dependent on whether
or not the physician told the patient about the test, this infor-
mation asymmetry is referred to as "physician-revealed de-
mand."
In this situation, society must largely rely on social constraints
on the behavior of physicians, or what Arrow calls a "collec-
tivity-orientation." 8 ' "Advice given by physicians as to further
treatment by himself or others is supposed to be completely
divorced from self-interest .... It is at least claimed that treat-
79. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488, 499-500 (1970).
80. The decision would be completely different if financial factors alone
determined the patient's choice. Most people have an emotional attachment
to their continued existence and well-being, which they value above the present
value of future cash flows.
81. Arrow, supra note 74, at 949.
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ment is dictated by the objective needs of the case and not
limited by financial considerations.' '82 It is not surprising that
these social constraints fail to contain health care costs, espe-
cially in view of third-party payment, discussed below. Decisions
to recommend unnecessary care cost the individual undergoing
the care very little. For physicians, such decisions may seem to
amount to "victimless crimes," outweighed by the more im-
mediate prospect of an income below that which physicians
believe their talents, education, skills, and hard work merit.
C. Third-Party Payment
The increased prevalence of third-party payment by employers,
the government, or both largely insulates the individual con-
sumer from the economic consequences of decisions to consume
more health care.83 In 1960, out-of-pocket payments financed
one-half of health care expenditures;8 in 1993, they will finance
less than one-fifth of health care expenditures. 81 Out-of-pocket
health care expenditures as a percent of disposable income are
projected to decline still further by the end of the decade.86
Consider again the hypothetical diagnostic test. The test costs
$1000 collectively for all those who will pay for it. Assume that
the patient is unwilling to pay the entire $1000 cost of the test
because the test has a value to her of only $500. If the patient
had to pay the entire $1000 price, she would decline to undergo
the test. However, the patient is a member of a standard
comprehensive medical plan that reimburses eighty percent of
the cost of all health care expenditures, with additional cata-
strophic expense protection. Whatever the patient paid for the
plan is a sunk cost. At the point of making the purchase
decision, the test will cost the patient $200. The rational patient
will undergo the test. The public, which finances the plan, will
absorb the utility loss of $500, the amount by which the total
82. Id. at 949-50.
83. To recognize this unfortunate feature of third-party payment is not at
all to question the desirability, indeed the necessity, of medical care insurance.
The question becomes what regulation, if any, is needed to make the market
for medical care insurance function more effectively.
84. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., OFFICE OF NAT'L COST ESTIMATES, National
Health Expenditures 1988, 11:4 HEALTH CARE FIN. Rv. 1, 3 (1990).
85. Sally T. Turner et al., National Health Expenditures Projections Though
2030, 14:1 HEALTH CA FIN. REv. 1, 20 (1992) (projecting 18.8% of national
health expenditures attributable to out-of-pocket expenses).
86. Id. at 22 (projecting 17.4% of national health expenditures attributable
to out-of-pocket expenses by 2000).
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cost of the test exceeds its value to the patient.8 7 This $500 is a
"negative externality," a cost not assumed by the purchaser,
but shared by a larger public. In this common situation, the
third-party payment encourages over-consumption of health care.
Another detrimental effect of third-party payment is that it
reduces the incentive on the part of health care purchasers to
obtain information on better prices.8" Because they are not
paying the full cost of treatment, patients see no need to expend
time and effort in determining the most cost-effective cure.
D. Choice of Coverage
A similar analysis applies to choice of coverage decisions.
Employees often have a choice among different health care
plans, all of which are subsidized to various extents by their
employers. Assume a choice between a standard comprehensive
medical indemnity insurance plan and a staff model health
maintenance organization (HMO). The comprehensive medical
plan costs $200 per month for individual employee coverage and
offers completely free choice of providers with 80 percent re-
imbursement of covered expenses. The HMO costs $150 per
month for individual employee coverage and provides treatment
by only its salaried doctors at the HMO facility.
Consider three different contribution schemes. In the first,
the employer pays 80 percent of the cost of whatever option
the employee chooses, and makes available a flexible benefits
credit of $80 a month that the employee can choose to apply,
pre-tax, to offset a contribution to a medical plan, or receive
as taxable wages. In the second, the employer contributes only
80 percent of the cost of the HMO, or $120 per month, and
makes available the same flexible benefits credit of $80 per
month. In the third case, the employer contributes $120 per
month and the employee contribution must be made from after-
tax income.
Assume that the employee pays taxes at a thirty-one percent
marginal rate and that he uses the flexible credit, if available,
to the extent necessary to pay his required contribution. Table
87. Empirical studies have supported the theoretical hypothesis that third-
party payment increases consumption of medical care. The most important
study is Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (Rand, Feb. 1988).
See generally Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Some Interim Results from a
Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED.
150f (1981) (finding individuals with full insurance coverage consume 50%
more service than do individuals with income-related catastrophe insurance).
88. Arrow, supra note 74, at 962.
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1 illustrates the difference in after-tax dollars between selection
of the indemnity plan versus selection of the HMO.
TABLE 1
Cost of Plan
Employer Contribution
Less Flex Credit
Flex Credit Remaining
Employee Contribution
EE After-Tax Income
Difference of HMO Plan
over Indemnity Plan
If the employee values the indemnity plan $40 per month
more than the HMO plan, then under either of the first two
contribution schemes, this employee will choose the indemnity
plan. Under the third, he will choose the HMO plan.
In the first contribution scheme, both the employer and the
government contribute to the entire cost of either plan; there
are two "third-party" payors. In the second scheme, the em-
ployer makes a fixed contribution to either plan, but the gov-
ernment makes a larger contribution when the employee chooses
the indemnity plan over an increase in wages. In the last scheme,
neither the government nor the employer pay any of the addi-
tional cost of the indemnity plan.89
In summary, the marginal difference in cost to the employee
resulting from the presence or absence of a tax-favored employee
contribution is sufficient to affect the employee's choice of plan,
even though the tax benefit, the difference between cases two
and three, is only $15.50 per month. 9° An employee who values
89. This discussion deliberately, and at the cost of some circumlocution,
avoids any discussion of the non-inclusion in employee income of the base
employer contribution, whether a fixed percentage or a fixed dollar amount.
Obviously, inclusion of the employer contribution in taxable income would
reduce by the employee's marginal tax rate the value of a greater contribution
to a more expensive plan. However, non-inclusion of a fixed dollar amount
in taxable income does not directly affect employee choice among plans, unless
lower net income leads the employee to set a lower value on the coverage
differences between the plans.
90. This example, not coincidentally, anticipates the criticism of the existing
tax regime that begins infra at part IV.
Use1 Case 2 Case 3
ER pays 80% ER pays 80% of HMO ER pays $120
S80 Flex Credit S80 Flex Credit
Indemnity HM0 Indemnity HMO Indemnity HMO
Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan
$200.00 S150.00 $200.00 S150.00 $200.00 $150.00
(s160.00) ($120.00) ($120.00) (S120.00) ($120.00) ($120.00)
($80.00) (S80.00) (S8.00) ($80.00)
($40.00) (S50.00) $0.00 ($50.00)
$80.00 $30.00
$27.60 S34.50 $0.00 $34.50 ($80.00) ($30.00)
$6.90 $34.50 $50.00
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the indemnity plan at only $20 per month more than the HMO
plan would choose the HMO plan in both cases two and three.
For these employees, the difference in employer contribution
policy alone is enough to modify their selection, regardless of
the availability of a tax benefit for employee contribution.
Finally, an employee who values the indemnity plan over $50
per month more than the HMO plan will choose the indemnity
plan regardless of both the employer contribution policy and
the tax treatment of the employee contribution.
The end result of the interactions between employer contri-
bution policy and tax policy is to skew consumer choice. As
such, it leads to overconsumption and distortions in health care
distribution.
E. Private Costs versus Social Costs
The usual level of analysis in considering economic efficiency
is that of the individual rational economic actor. Such an
analysis draws a distinction between "private" costs and "so-
cial" costs, as in the example of the MRI with third-party
payment examined above.91
At the level of private costs, there are few positive health
care externalities. An obvious example is inoculation against
infectious disease. Individuals not only safeguard their own
health when they are immunized, but lower the risk of infection
for all those with whom they come in contact. The government
has at times sought to compel immunizations that might oth-
erwise be underconsumed, as with the now obsolete smallpox
vaccination once required for children attending school and, for
a time, mandatory polio immunizations.
Most externalities are negative. Preventive care does not gen-
erate negative externalities at the level of private costs if the
individual is allowed to bear the full costs, either in medical
care or in illness and early death, alone. However, when society
is unwilling to allow an individual to bear the full costs of an
earlier, improvident decision, as when it subsidizes the care of
a condition that might have been prevented, then society's failure
to promote or require the preventive care that could have
avoided the more expensive restorative care does generate neg-
ative externalities.
Consider two extreme examples. First, a crack-addicted mother
chooses not to avail herself of or cannot obtain prenatal care
or drug treatment. Her child is prematurely born. If the state
provides nursery care, either through Medicaid or in a municipal
91. See supra part III.
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hospital, the cost could be hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The total social monetary cost92 would probably be lower if the
state actively promoted and provided prenatal care and drug
treatment. The cost would certainly be lower if the state could
compel the mother to receive both prenatal care and drug
treatment. Second, if the state provides AIDS treatment to
people whose sexual or intravenous drug use habits have led
them to contract the disease, this total social monetary cost
could be lower if the state promoted "safe sex" and provided
addicts with clean needles.
The phrase "socially cost-effective" incorporates both the
non-monetary emotional costs and the quantifiable effect on
domestic product of different treatment decisions. In other
words, the phrase accepts treatment decisions mandated by the
group ethic apart from economic considerations (e.g., that the
addict infected with AIDS should receive medical care), and
then seeks to maximize the difference between the individual's
contribution to domestic product and the resource cost of med-
ical care the individual receives.
Standard insurance packages often fail to provide socially
cost-effective care. Indemnity health care coverage, which still
predominates among individuals covered by health plans, 93 has
generally excluded care that was not "medically necessary." The
common definition of medically necessary includes diagnosis and
treatment of accidental injury or illness, but not preventive
care. 94 For example, "well baby care" coverage includes im-
munizations, the underutilization of which has been widely
discussed and universally condemned.95 Even today, well baby
care coverage is not always included in indemnity coverage, and
until quite recently, was not covered by the majority of indem-
nity plans.96 Such coverage restrictions do not promote socially
cost-effective care.
92. There are both monetary and non-monetary costs to coercion; the
latter particularly raise difficult questions of political philosophy in a pluralistic
democracy.
93. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM
AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS 49 tbl. 40 (1993); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS 44 tbl. 37
(1991).
94. See, e.g., Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d
1379, 1380 (11th Cir. 1993); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp.
1333, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Lehman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 806 F.
Supp. 859, 861-62 (D. Ariz. 1992).
95. See, e.g., Save the Children, Immunization Can Prevent Many Deaths,
SAN DiGo UNION-TRIB., Dec. 27, 1993, at B6.
96. For example, only 26% of nondurable good manufacturers surveyed
provided well baby coverage in 1992. WYATT COMPANY, COMPARISON: 1993
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT-GRouP BENEFITS 34 (1993).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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F. Licensing Requirements
Another imperfection of the health care market is the de-
manding entry requirements of formal education and licensing
imposed by the states on medical practitioners. Unduly restrictive
licensing requirements generally reduce supply by eliminating
some qualified entrants and thereby increasing price. However,
the elimination of one market imperfection in a market with
multiple imperfections does not necessarily lead to an improved
allocation of resources.Y
As George Akerlof noted, "[L]icensing practices also reduce
quality uncertainty.' 8 In the context of the information asym-
metries discussed above, licensing may lead patients to make
assumptions about the value of recommended treatment that
full disclosure would negate. In light of information asymmetries
and third-party payment, with the possibility of leveraged phy-
sician-induced demand they raise, restricted entry may well be
a blessing in disguise because it lowers total consumption of
inefficient medical care.
G. Net Effect of Market Imperfections
In the view of all payors for medical services and of many
suppliers as well, these market distortions have led to (1) over-
consumption of medical services in the aggregate, (2) the pay-
ment to physicians of premiums over the prices that would exist
in a competitive market (monopoly rents), 9 and (3) distortions
in the distribution of services provided. The system devotes too
many resources to the diagnosis and treatment of disease and
injury and too little to prevention.
A widely held view is that where imperfect markets exist, and
the economic cost of the resultant distortions warrants the
expense of government regulation, government regulation should
aim at approximating as closely as possible conditions in the
hypothetical efficient market.100 In an efficient market, the price
of a good or service equals its marginal cost, defined to include
a profit just great enough to keep the producer from leaving
the market.' 0' In view of the existing health care market imper-
97. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation
of Tax Incentives, 64 Tnx. L. REV. 973, 996-98 (1986).
98. Akerlot, supra note 79, at 500.
99. DENNIs C. MUELLER, PUBUC CHOICE II, at 239 (1989).
100. See, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAmLICH, BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS OF GOVERN-
MENT PROGRAMS 203 (1981); see also Arrow, supra note 74, at 947.
101. WEIMER & VINING, supra note 73, at 36-37, 266. The marginal cost of
the nth unit is the total cost of producing units one to n, less the total cost
of producing units one to n-I. In an efficient market, the price equals the
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fections, government intervention ought to be aimed at decreas-
ing amounts spent on diagnosis and treatment and increasing
amounts spent on prevention. Notwithstanding the appropriate-
ness of an attempt to shape health care policy through tax
policy, health care expenditures for diagnosis and treatment
should be reduced in favor of prevention expenditures.
Part V of this Article proposes reforms that would reduce
subsidies to health care consumption in such a way as to reduce
aggregate overconsumption of diagnostic and therapeutic serv-
ices, and to promote consumption of preventive services and
cost-effective diagnostic and treatment services.
IV. CRmTICSMs OF THE EXiSTING STRUCTURE FOR THE TAx
TREATMENT OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES
A. Tax Expenditures and Access
In general, criticism leveled at the current tax treatment of
health care expenditures follows the pioneering work of the late
Stanley S. Surrey'02 and questions the appropriateness of using
marginal cost equals the average cost. Id. If it is true that physicians exact
monopoly rents, then the economic argument for price controls might well be
stronger than the discussion of price controls as a possible temporary element
of the Administration's health care reform package would suggest.
Though the reforms currently under consideration will eventually eliminate
monopoly rents and the need for price controls in the future, short-term price
controls might reduce costs during the transitional period. One idea is an
additional, progressive tax on care-provider revenues stemming from govern-
ment and tax-subsidized sources. Such a tax would reduce the incentive to
provide unnecessary care and help finance increased access. An approach that
merely controls the unit price of services would likely be ineffective.
All income paid for physician services by a government program (e.g.,
Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Administration, etc.) or by a program eligible
for tax credits would be allocated to specific physicians. A graduated tax
could be levied upon this amount, in addition to the income tax, with rates
set so as to recover the monopoly rents now paid to physicians. As marketplace
reforms took hold and squeezed out monopoly rents, the tax rates would be
reduced and, over 5 or 10 years, the tax eliminated.
The progressive nature of the tax would reduce the incentive to provide
additional services subject to it as total income from covered services rose.
Assuming a rational reduction, as opposed to random reduction, less cost-
effective services would be eliminated.
Unit cost controls are ineffective. They are subject to avoidance by shifting
to uncontrolled services (e.g., the introduction of Medicare hospital DRGs
saw a shift to uncontrolled outpatient care), or to abuse by the unnecessary
multiplication of controlled services.
102. E.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM, THE CONCEPT
OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device
for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Governmenthttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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the tax structure as an instrument of social policy. Professor
Surrey asserted that: "This criticism - that tax incentives
produce inequitable effects and upside-down benefits - is valid
as to the general run of tax incentives." 03 Professor Surrey gave
an example of a proposal, not enacted, for eliminating a gross
income threshold for the section 213 deduction:
What HEW Secretary would propose a medical assis-
tance program for the aged that cost $200 million,
and under which $90 million would go to persons with
incomes over $50,000, and only $8 million to persons
with incomes under $5,000? The tax proposal to re-
move the 3% floor under the medical expense deduc-
tion of persons over 65 would have had just that
effect. ,04
Implicit in this example is the assumption that the only goal
in eliminating the gross income floor was to stimulate consump-
tion of medical services by the medically under-served aged.
Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), applying similar logic
with the same implicit assumption, recently commented on the
regressivity of the current system. He noted that families with
incomes below $15,000 get only 2.6 percent of the tax benefits
from employer-provided health care, while families earning above
$50,000 get 57 percent. 105
Spending, 83 HAXv. L. REv. 705 (1970) [hereinafter Tax Incentives]. The "tax
expenditure" concept presupposes the existence of an ideal tax base from
which a tax expenditure is a deviation. Boris Bittker criticized the presuppo-
sition of an ideal tax base in Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969). Professors Surrey and Hellmuth
replied to Professor Bittker in The Tax Expenditure Budget - Response to
Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAx J. 528 (1969), to which Professor Bittker
responded in The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Reply to Professors Surrey
& Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969).
103. Tax Incentives, supra note 102, at 722.
104. Id.
105. Dave Durenberger, Viewpoints: Choices for the Clinton Era; Time for
Fairness on Health Premiums, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 28, 1993, § 3, at 25. Further
proof of the assumption implicit in this criticism is that a reduction in tax
rate progressivity was not a goal of excluding employer health care contribu-
tions from employee income. The 1986 tax reform demonstrated the validity
of this hypothesis when it flattened tax rates and eliminated many deductions.
One may argue, however, that the total effect of current income tax rates and
deductions is too progressive, despite the regressive character of excluding
employer contributions to health care plans from employee income. Consider,
for example, the mileage presidential candidate Jerry Brown got out of the
flat tax proposal in the 1992 Democratic primaries. See David Lightman,
Voters Defy Easy Predictions; Polls Still Give Clinton Lead, but not Over-
whelming One, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 3, 1992, at Al. Someone subscrib-
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The endpoint of the regressivity argument highlights the cur-
rent system's failure to provide adequate benefits to those citi-
zens whose employers do not provide them with health care
coverage or to those too poor to pay income taxes, and failure
to provide anything at all to those who are in both groups. The
current structure of tax subsidy for health care does very little
to address problems of access.
Although the current tax structure is flawed, the use of tax
expenditures for health care is not necessarily inappropriate. In
two recent articles, Edward A. Zelinsky endorsed tax expendi-
tures as the most efficient instrument to achieve social policy in
some circumstances.' °6 Professor Zelinsky emphasized the im-
portance of transaction costs when choosing between the use of
direct expenditures and tax expenditures in advancing social
policy goals. 0 7 For tax policy to modify the behavior of a large
number of entities, policy must be implemented through an
existing, far-reaching system such as the income tax system.
Harnessing an existing system to alter behavior will significantly
reduce administrative costs. Forged by intense public debate and
input from a plethora of factions, the resulting policy will
improve upon past direct expenditure programs. 08 Applying
Professor Zelinsky's criteria for appropriate use of the tax code
to the problem of correcting health care market imperfections
suggests that the use of tax incentives is appropriate to promote
universal access to cost-effective care.
B. Third-Party Payment Problem
As discussed above, the relatively small part of the total
payment made by the individual at the point of purchase en-
ing to Brown's view might believe that the appropriate corrective action to
eliminate the deduction would be a reduction in the higher marginal rates, a
regime that would not promote more effective consumption of health care by
the medically under-served poor.
Nevertheless, a poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard
University, and Louis Harris & Associates indicated that 61% of those polled
favored higher income taxes on those earning $50,000 or more to finance
health reform. Combination Reform Plan, supra note 16. Further, the Clinton
proposals to attack the deficit by raising taxes on the wealthy have encountered
remarkably little resistance. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed
that the regressive effects of excluding employer contributions from employee
income should be avoided.
106. See Zelinsky, supra note 97, at 1033-35. See generally Edward A.
Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YAE L.J. 1165 (1993).
107. Zelinsky, supra note 97, at 1010. Although Zelinsky did not specifically
mention breadth of the intended scope of the policy incentive as an index of
the appropriateness of its implementation through the tax code, it seems that
coverage scope is one such index.
108. Zelinsky, supra note 106, at 1175-84, 1190-91.https://openscholarship.w stl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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courages overconsumption of medical services.9 Overconsump-
tion also results if the employer pays a fixed percentage of the
cost of whatever health care coverage the employee elects"0
because an employee unwilling to pay the full additional cost
of coverage offering a greater degree of individual choice may
well find such coverage attractive when the employer pays a
part of the additional premium.
When employees must pay their contributions with after-tax
dollars, the existing tax structure does not compound the effect
of the employer subsidy. However, in some flexible benefit
plans, the employee pre-tax credit will be large enough to finance
the more expensive plan at the cost of foregoing other tax-
exempt benefits, or in some cases, cash. When individuals can
receive taxable cash as an alternative to a non-taxable employer
health care contribution, an alternative in seventy percent of
section 125 cafeteria plans,"' the tax subsidy will prompt some
individuals to choose more expensive plans requiring lower point-
of-service payments than they would if they could receive the
savings in non-taxable cash. Membership in such plans will lead
to increased consumption of health care because of the negative
externalities to which third-party payments give rise. Further,
the individual might choose a tax-subsidized health care benefit
that is not cost-effective over benefits with a stronger justifica-
tion for a tax subsidy (assuming they exist)." 2
C. Cost
Because the existing tax system encourages consumption of
health care services that is not socially cost-effective, and that
inadequately encourages cost-effective preventive care, taxpayers
are subsidizing socially cost-ineffective care. Assuming the min-
imum amount is that which would be raised by recent proposals
to the exclusion from employee income of employer contribu-
tions to health care, the existing tax system provides a subsidy
of perhaps $17 billion for health care which is not socially cost-
effective." 3
109. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
110. See supra part III.D.
11l. HEwnir AssoctiATs, FLEXIBLE COMPENSATION PROGRAMS AND PRAC-
TcEs 12 (1993). This survey is based on the 1992 plan year.
112. See supra part III.D.
113. See Stout, supra note 20. In arriving at the figure of $17 billion, it is
assumed that Stout's data, which illustrates the effect of the tax cap, takes
only income tax, and not social security, into account. The figure does not
include the increase in state revenues likely to accompany a redefinition of
federal taxable income, to which many state income tax laws are linked.
For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the proposed minimum
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V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Normative Reform of Health Care
1. Employee/Employer Tax Code Reform
There is nothing about the imperfections of the health care
market that logically binds its correction to the employment
relationship of health care consumers. Unlike disability income,
retirement income, or unemployment income, there is no logical
relationship between the need for insurance protection and em-
ployment. Indeed, given a social ethic that demands provision
of a certain level of care regardless of individual resources or
of individual responsibility for the illness at issue,"' 4 normative
health care reform must provide coverage regardless of employ-
ment status. Further, the theoretically ideal level of coverage
does not vary with employment status; rather, it covers all
"socially cost-effective care." Ideal coverage does not reimburse
individuals for health care spending that results from their
personal preferences but which is not socially cost-effective." 5
Thus, like earlier government health care mandates such as
smallpox and polio inoculations and quarantines, the mandate
to acquire health care coverage should fall on the individual.
Individuals who lack the resources to provide for their own
coverage should have their coverage subsidized to the extent
required by their individual situations.
An individual mandate, combined with individual credits if
required, would demonstrate the inappropriateness of the exclu-
sion from employee income of employer contributions for em-
ployee health care coverage. Exclusion from employee income
plan will provide all socially cost-effective benefits. It is also assumed that the
lowest priced minimum plan will cost less than the current average priced
employer provided plan, which is frequently the cost used in the discussion
of tax caps and the resulting revenue gains. In support of this assumption, a
comparison of staff model HMOs to standard indemnity care provided esti-
mates of unnecessary health care. The comparison examined the amount of
duplication in health care facilities and geographical variations in practice
patterns with no observable differences in health outcomes. The study surmised
that the average plan provides a great deal of unnecessary care. See CONG.
BUDGET OFF., MANAGED COMPETITION AND ITS POTENTIAL TO REDUCE HEALTH
SPENDING at xiii, 35-37 (1993) [hereinafter MANAGED COMPETITION]. Thus it is
reasonable to regard the floor for the tax subsidy for unnecessary care as
equivalent to the revenue tax caps would raise. The estimate of the tax subsidy
for wasteful care of $17 billion is conservatively low.
114. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text; see also Graetz, supra
note 20, at 79-80.
115. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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leads to overconsumption of health care.116 In the absence of
an employer mandate, employer contributions are clearly com-
pensation. Under normative health care reform, section 213
should be repealed in its entirety. Any medical expenditures not
covered by insurance would be personal consumption. As a
consequence of the repeal of section 213, health expenditures
should no longer qualify for section 125 flexible spending ac-
counts. The section 32(b)(2) credit should also be repealed.
2. "Sin" Taxes
A fundamental principle of economics is that the price of an
item should include all of its costs. A draft study by the Office
of Technology Assessment put the loss to society from smoking-
related medical costs and sick leave at $65 billion." 7 This esti-
mate does not appear to include productivity lost due to de-
creased function while on the job, perhaps an even larger
amount. Further, fires caused by smoking also lead to smoking-
related losses. Many believe that these costs are not currently
recovered in the price of a pack of cigarettes, because the
manufacturers are not responsible for reimbursing those who
actually bear the loss. If so, then an increased tax on smoking
materials represents a classic case of desirable government reg-
ulation, because the dispersion of the interests affected makes
negotiating a solution among affected individuals impossible.
Even in the absence of any other health care reform, the
imposition of a $2.50 per pack excise tax on cigarettes would
erase the annual $65 billion loss." 8 The same argument can be
made with respect to excise taxes on alcohol.
3. A Level Playing Field: Removal of the Exemption for
"Charitable" Hospitals
Recapture of the projected windfall that some providers might
reap from the elimination of bad debts and other uncompensated
care by a system providing universal access figures into the
discussion of how to finance universal access. Perhaps the
simplest and fairest way to share the windfall is to repeal the
section 501(c)(3) exemption for hospitals and other tax-exempt
health care providers; all providers of health care should be
subject to income tax (and to the extent that they are linked,
116. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
117. Cigarette Tax Hike Would Improve Health, Cut Spending, Raise
Revenue, Study Finds, BNA HEALTH CARE DAn.Y, May 27, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAHCD File.
118. Id.
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to state and local taxes as well). 1 9 This would recapture thirty-
four percent of the additional revenues of profitable health care
providers, as well as some portion of their existing revenues.
The revenue estimate for this change is $2.5 billion annually. 20
B. The Politically Attainable "Second Best"
1. A Proposal
The insuperable obstacle to adoption of the normative ideal
can be stated in a single word: taxes. Making universal coverage
a reality without an employer mandate would require substantial
additional revenues or an increase in deficit spending, which
would doom any package that does not contain an employer
mandate. '2
The alternate health care system proposed in this Article
maintains the goals of providing universal access to cost-effective
care and the elimination of the provision of care that is not
119. See supra notes 51, 69-72 and accompanying text.
120. See Rudney & Copeland, supra note 57. This change would also
increase state and local tax revenues. Some limitations on tax breaks for non-
profit health providers are increasingly advocated. Id. See also Robert Tomsho,
Tax Breaks Threatened, Some Hospitals Try to Prove How Charitable They
Are, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1994, at BI (citing several hospitals' responses to
proposed elimination of charitable exemption); Kaiser Dispute Sparks Bill to
Tax Non-profits, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 22, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAHCD File (referring .to a California bill "that
would require non-profit, tax-exempt corporations like Kaiser to pay taxes on
any profits sent out of state"). This movement has surpassed mere advocacy.
Recent Texas legislation required non-profit hospitals to provide a specified
level of charity care in order to qualify for exemption from state taxes. Texas
Charity Care Law Signed, Suit against Methodist Settled, BNA HEALTH CARE
DAILY, June 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAHCD File. In
the context of universal coverage, this bill would have the effect of subjecting
non-profits to taxes at the state level.
121. Prof. Graetz stated:
[W]ithin the existing system there is enough money to fund a
standard package of insurance coverage for all Americans, includ-
ing an equitable and even generous system of tax credits. This
means that with enough reshuffling of existing expenditures, ad-
ditional government financing may not be necessary. In any case,
it is essential to make much more effective use of the revenues
that current subsidies cost the government.
Graetz, supra note 20, at 99. This statement is unduly sanguine, despite the
qualification which immediately follows it:
The political trick - and no one should underestimate how
great a trick it is - is to manage the transition from the system
we now have to the system of individually-based universal coverage
I have proposed.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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cost-effective, just as the normative reform does. This pragmatic
program includes government mandates that require employers
to operate as intermediaries between providers of health care
and their employees and to contribute to the cost of their
employees' health care coverage. For the program to be politi-
cally acceptable, this type of employer mandate is necessary
because it would supply the additional revenues needed to pro-
vide universal access.
To enhance the prospects of adopting an economically sound
program, the current level of financial contribution made by
each ultimate payor of health care costs (state and federal
governments, businesses, and individuals) must be preserved. In
this manner, the additional fiscal effort required to extend access
to cost-effective care to those currently without it would be kept
to a minimum. Tax increases and non-tax increases in business
costs attributable to health care reform can be circumscribed,
which will increase the likelihood that both the tax-paying public
and other payor constituencies will support the plan. 2
In addition to these employer mandates, there also must be
an individual mandate; every individual would have to enroll in
a plan providing at least a specified minima of benefits. 23 The
individual mandate is an element of normative reform. Initially,
of course, it would be relevant only with respect to the self-
employed, the non-Medicare retired, and the unemployed. In-
cluding an individual mandate in the initial reform package
would simplify later movement toward the theoretical ideal. 24
122. The Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 50% of workers would
be willing to pay an additional $20 in taxes per month for a universal health
care plan that combined federal regulation of rates charged by health care
providers with the freedom to choose providers. Combination Reform Plan,
supra note 16. Only 24% were willing to pay an additional $50 per month
for such a plan. Id. The stiff opposition among small business groups to
achieving universal coverage in part through a mandate on employers to offer
and fund health care coverage for their employees flows from a fear of a
sharp increase in the cost of doing business by those who do not currently
provide coverage. See Graetz, supra note 20, at 101-02.
123. A health care structure that would permit plans to compete based on
additional benefits beyond the specified minimum plan should be viewed with
suspicion. Ostensibly, the additional benefits would be available at additional
cost to the specific offeror's minimum plan. Certain benefits appeal to classes
highly desirable from a medical underwriting perspective, e.g., well baby care.
Families with young children are good health care risks. If one plan were
permitted to offer well baby care while others could choose to exclude it, the
first plan could lower its prices overall, not because of superior efficiency,
but because it could anticipate favorable selection. The first plan would thus
gain a competitive advantage that all critics of the existing system think
important to eliminate.
124. This should ease somewhat the concern of Professor Graetz, that
adoption of an employer mandate now would forever inhibit movement toward
a fundamentally sounder system. Graetz, supra note 20, at 94-95.
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Further, adding an individual mandate to an employer man-
date would eliminate many of the evils Professor Graetz iden-
tified in the employer mandate-only scheme. Temporary or part-
time employment, as opposed to permanent employment, could
not be used to escape required coverage; the individual would
have to consider the cost remaining after an employer contri-
bution, and the employer would have to contribute a portion
of the cost. Individuals who work as independent contractors
would have to include any reduction in individual credit that
their compensation would cause in calculating the minimum
wage that makes work a rational decision.'25
The specified minimum plan is assumed, albeit unrealistically
for purposes of simplicity, to include all benefits the consump-
tion of which will minimize total societal health care costs.
126
An assumption that strong, however, is unnecessary. All that
need be assumed is that the mix of health care services in the
minimum package is more socially cost-effective than the current
mix of services actually consumed.
2. Dual System of Credits and Other Changes
This Article proposes a system of dual refundable credits, one
to take the place of a section 162 business expense deduction
for contributions to health care plans by employers, and the
other to take the place of the exclusion in employee income of
employer contributions to health care benefit plans. No deduc-
tion would be permitted for employer contributions to health
care plans, and such contributions would be fully includible in
employee income. Self-employed individuals would be entitled
to the full individual credit only, and the existing partial de-
duction would be eliminated. No corporate credit would be
permitted for anyone with a distributive share (actual or con-
structive) in the profits of a business entity not subject to the
corporate income tax, or for a five percent owner (actual or
constructive) of a corporation subject to the corporate tax, but
125. Id. at 90-91.
126. This definition in all likelihood means a more comprehensive plan than
any plan actually likely to be proposed because of the importance in the
political debate of the difference between "on-budget" and "off-budget"
costs. "Normative" reform, which provides direct federal subsidies to low-
income individuals otherwise unable to comply with an individual health care
mandate, would increase the amount of health care spending in the federal
budget even though it might be the most effective at lowering total societal
spending on health care. This move from "off-budget" spending (e.g., un-
compensated emergency room care) to "on-budget" spending (e.g., federally
financed coverage for care provided in a clinic), is a political liability. See
supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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such individuals would be eligible for the individual credit.
In conformity with the normative reform, section 213 would
be repealed in its entirety, and in consequence, health expendi-
tures would no longer qualify for section 125 flexible spending
accounts. The section 32(b)(2) credit would be repealed. The
section 501(c)(3) exemption for hospitals would be repealed; all
providers of health care would be subject to income tax (and
to the extent that they are linked, to state and local taxes as
well). Tax-exempt bonds would no longer be eligible to provide
capital to health care institutions.
Also a part of this proposal, as well as of the normative
reform, are increases in excise taxes on cigarettes and on alcohol
in amounts sufficient to compensate for all the negative exter-
nalities their use generates that are not offset by existing taxa-
tion.
Both the employer and employee credits would vary with the
cost of a "minimum plan." Under a managed competition
regime, 127 for instance, the minimum plan would be the lowest-
price Accountable Health Plan 28 open to employees within the
Health Alliance, 129 or within some geographic subdivision of the
Health Alliance to which the employee belonged. 30 At its min-
imum, the employer credit would equal the highest corporate
tax rate times the cost of the lowest-price plan. The credit would
be the equivalent of offering a profitable employer a tax de-
duction for the cost of the lowest-price plan. For smaller and
less profitable employers, the credit would increase. For em-
ployers with fewer than twenty-five employees and no taxable
income in the fiscal year, the credit would be equal to the full
cost of the lowest-price plan. The credit would be proportion-
ately reduced for part-time employees for whom the employer
was required to make only a partial contribution toward the
127. For a readable discussion of "managed competition," see MANAGED
COMPETrITON, supra note 113, at 9-17.
128. An Accountable Health Plan (AHP) is a health care delivery organi-
zation that combines the services of health insurance with provision of medical
care to patients. AHPs can take various forms and are sometimes called
"integrated care organizations." AHPs compete on the basis of quality and
cost. See Jackson Hole Group, Managed Competition II, supra this volume.
129. A Health Alliance, or a health plan purchasing cooperative, is a sponsor
organization that functions as a purchasing agent of health care services; it
enables small employers, the self-employed, unemployed, and other individuals
to band together to purchase health care services at competitive rates. Id.
130. It is conceivable that the delegation of legislative power to non-
governmental groups would require an officer of the executive branch to make
formal determination of the amount of the credit, or else constitutional issues
arise. However, a discussion of possible constitutional obstacles to health care
reform goes beyond the scope of this Article.
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cost of the lowest-priced benefit plan. The credit would gradate
smoothly from maximum to minimum based on both employer
size and level of profitability, reaching its minimum level either
at $50,000 of taxable income or at 200 employees. No employer
credit would be available for retirees eligible for Medicare.',
A credit of this type, varying by size and net income, would
not sacrifice administrative simplicity in its effort to target the
credit toward those most in need. Nor would the credit forego
tax revenues from those who do need subsidies. 3 2
In a similar fashion, the individual credit would increase from
a base level of the average individual effective tax rate times
the cost of the minimum plan. The base level would apply to
those who receive a health care contribution from their employ-
ers or who have net incomes above 150 percent of the poverty
line. The credit would increase to a maximum level of the full
cost of the lowest-price plan for those without any employer
contribution and with incomes below the poverty line. No in-
dividual eligible for Medicare would be eligible for this credit.,'
3. Rationale
Fundamental to the success of any health care reform is its
ability to squeeze out inappropriate medical care. These sug-
gested reforms would achieve this objective over time.
Non-deductibility and inclusion in income of amounts con-
tributed for health plans above the cost of the minimum plan
would create a powerful incentive for employers to contribute
only the cost of the minimum plan and will increase the mag-
nitude and visibility of employee contributions. Availability of
an Accountable Health Plan would mean that the Health Alli-
ance has certified that it meets minimum quality and solvency
standards. This certification should create a level of acceptability
for the lowest-priced plan that would make it a creditable
competitor of higher-prilced alternatives. There should be a
substantial guaranteed market share for the lowest-cost plan.
For example, the lowest-cost plan could automatically include
the Medicaid population. This would create a considerable mar-
keting incentive to be the lowest-priced plan.
131. This is a description of goals rather than either an attempt at exact
statutory language or a failure to recognize that drafting language to achieve
these goals will be difficult. The author has the advantage of having seen a
detailed proposal for an employer credit drafted by Joseph Piacentini of
Aetna's Health Issues area.
132. This responds to some of the concerns of Professor Graetz. Graetz,
supra note 20, at 90.
133. Id. at 99-100.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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Prospectively-rated plans would achieve their greatest level of
profitability when they provide only cost-effective care. How-
ever, continuing enrollment is likely to mean that the same plan
would in later years bear the cost of withholding appropriate
care, including preventive care. Market entrants for the long
term, likely to be the only ones willing to make the initial
investments required to participate, would have no incentive to
withhold appropriate care. Indeed, their incentive would be to
provide all the care that is appropriate.
Successful plans would refuse to deliver care that is not cost-
effective. A physician in such a plan would not mention the
unneeded MRI exemplified above,1 34 and in the unlikely event
that the patient spontaneously requests the MRI, the physician
would explain that it is not indicated and that its cost would
not be covered by the plan.
Plans would be unlikely to survive if they allowed their costs
sharply to exceed the minimum plan. With no employer or
government subsidies for excess costs, participants would opt
out of plans that cost them too much in disposable income. In
the current environment, indemnity insurers find that they ex-
perience severe reductions in plan participation, with extreme
anti-selection, when the difference between an HMO and an
indemnity plan in the contribution required reaches $75 per
month for an individual and $125 per month for a family.13 5
Underwriting guidelines often prohibit offering an indemnity
plan when the contribution differential is much lower, such as
$40 per month for individuals and $60 per month for families.
This is true even though these contribution differentials are
often from pre-tax dollars. 36 The contribution differentials at
which Accountable Health Plans would begin to experience
severe declines in membership could easily be twenty-five percent
lower than in the current environment because any increase in
contributions required for a more expensive plan would have to
be paid for entirely with after-tax dollars.
This system of limited credits reflects the views of Professor
Andrews about the proper treatment of medical expenses in an
income tax:
What distinguishes medical expenses from other per-
sonal expenses at bottom is a sense that large differ-
ences in their magnitude between people in otherwise
134. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of
information asymmetries.
135. Telephone interview with Michael J. Murray, Aetna Health Plans
Actuary (May 23, 1993).
136. Id.
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similar circumstances are apt to reflect differences in
need rather than choices among gratifications....
[P]articular medical expenses may reflect a consid-
erable component of voluntary personal gratifica-
tion. 137 It is difficult to find any difference in principle,
for example, between expenditures for elective plastic
surgery and for cosmetics. 3 '
Professor Andrews did not think that differentiations in tax
policy that would enable us to capture the distinction we would
want on theoretical grounds between these two categories were
practical. 3 9 However, Professor Andrews also believed, "In the
absence of more information, . . . I conclude that any misal-
location produced by the medical expense deduction is harmless
enough to be clearly outweighed by the distributional consider-
ations that justify the deduction."' 14 Given the widespread belief
that tax-aggravated problems of over-allocation of resources to
the health sector is a serious economic problem, Professor
Andrews might arrive at a different conclusion today than the
one he reached in 1972.
Professor Andrews suggested an alternative:
[I]f it were very important to avoid the allocational
effect of the deduction, then theoretically one could
leave the (horizontal) distributional problem to be
taken care of by insurance. People would pay their
insurance premiums out of after-tax income, but would
not be taxed on benefits received. Accordingly, the
consumption component of their taxable income would
reflect whatever level of coverage they chose to pay
for without reflecting differences in need and actual
utilization of services. 141
With two emendations to these remarks, adding "for coverage
above the minimum" after "insurance premiums," and "above
the minimum" after "level of coverage," the proposed system
of credits would satisfy Andrews' requirements for an alloca-
137. It seems reasonable to consider the degree of physician choice de-
manded as a matter of voluntary consumption. Assuming a fixed benefit plan
with risk-adjusted premiums, the degree of physician choice available is likely
to be the principal determinant of the price of a plan.
138. Andrews, supra note 61, at 336-37.
139. Id. at 337.
140. Id. at 343.
141. Id. at 342-43. Professor Andrews believed that there were difficulties
with this approach as well, of course (limited access, third-party payment
incentives to overutilization), but the assumed health reform proposal addresses
all of them.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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tionally non-distorting and distributionally-just tax treatment of
health care expenditures.
These recommendations would penalize employer provision of
care that was not socially cost-effective by both depriving the
employer of a deduction of its cost and including that contri-
bution in employee income. This would make the employer
provision of excess health care disfavored with respect to wages,
inverting the current relationship.
Any individual purchase of excess health care would be tax
neutral, without the possibility of qualifying in combination
with other out-of-pocket health care expenditures for a section
213 deduction. This shift, though of much less significance than
the change in treatment of employer-provided excess care, nev-
ertheless would constitute less favorable tax treatment of indi-
vidual health care expenditures than presently offered.
A system of credits would add progressivity to the tax system
and thus responds to the criticism that the current system of
deductions is too regressive. Very importantly, the proposed
system should go far toward meeting the concerns of small
business that a mandate on employers to offer and fund health
care would be economically disabling.
It is the desire to exact the maximum politically feasible
employer contribution, while simultaneously extending access to
cost-effective care to the medically underserved, that leads to
the recommendation of this admittedly complex system of dual
credits over the conceptually cleaner and administratively simpler
scheme of an individual mandate and credit only, with employer
deduction of contributions to health care plans up to the value
of the minimum plan permitted. Warnings about the dire threat
to solvency and jobs resulting from employer mandates imposed
on small businesses appear frequently in the press. 142 For ex-
ample, in a study released May 20, 1993, the National Federation
of Independent Business estimated that various mandates would
cost between 390,000 and 900,000 jobs over the first two or
three years of the plan. 143 A variable credit is a mechanism that
could extract as high a level of support as possible from small
business for extending access to health care without fatally
wounding the chances of legislative reform. The variable credit
will be a key element in creating a package that Congress can
pass.
142. See supra note 15.
143. Small Business Could Lose 900,000 Jobs From Mandated Health
Coverage, NFIB Says, BNA HEALTH CARE DAnY, May 24, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAHCD File.
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4. Cost of Reform
The Congressional Budget Office estimated the revenue gains
from full inclusion in employee income of employer health care
contributions, with a refundable individual credit of 20 percent
for health insurance premiums up to the average cost of em-
ployer-provided coverage, at $57 billion for the period 1994-
98.14 This alternative approximates the double-credit, full inclu-
sion, no deduction proposal, with resulting gains of close to $57
billion. Eliminating the deductibility of interest on bonds used
to fund private hospital facilities would net $3 billion in 1993.'14
Any tax benefit gained because of the non-deductibility of
employer contributions for excess coverage not offset by the
employer credit would presumably fade away very quickly, as
employers moved to substitute deductible wages for non-de-
ductible excess contributions. However, this transformation of
the non-includible employer contributions into taxable wages
would raise a minimum of $17 billion, as noted above.'"
C. Clinton's Health Security Act
It is tempting to comment at much greater length on the
Clinton Health Security Act (Clinton Plan)4 7 than the analysis
that appears above warrants. This temptation is left to others.
The Clinton Plan is basically sound, but would be improved if
it conformed more closely to the recommendations of the pre-
ceding section in those places where it deviates.
1. Plan Provisions
The comprehensive benefit plan summarized in section 1101141
comes surprisingly close to the ideal health care reform outlined
above.149 Section 1114 contains, in great specificity, an admirable
144. REDUCING TE DEFicrr, supra note 34, at 364.
145. JoiNT Comm. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG, 2D SEss., EsTIMATEs oF
FEDERAL TAX ExPENDrruREs FOR FIscAL YEARs 1993-1997, at 15 tbl. 7 (1992).
146. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
147. H.R. 3600 & S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Clinton
Plan].
148. Proposed § 1101 provides that the "comprehensive benefit package"
shall include hospital services, services of health professionals, emergency and
ambulatory medical and surgical services, clinical preventive services, mental
health and substance abuse services, family planning and pregnancy services,
hospice care, home health care, extended care, ambulance services, outpatient
laboratory, radiology, and diagnostic services, prescription drugs, outpatient
rehabilitation services, durable medical equipment and prosthetic and orthotic
devices, vision and dental care, health education classes, and investigational
treatments. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 1101.
149. See supra notes 114-20 for a discussion of the theoretically ideal health
care plan.https://op nscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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emphasis on preventive services. 50 Section 1153 builds upon this
good beginning by granting the National Health Board the
authority to modify the items and the age and frequency sched-
ules included among clinical preventive services.151
The Clinton Plan would impose an individual mandate in
section 1002.152 Section 6104 would provide premium discounts
based on income.' These discounts would be functionally equiv-
alent to refundable tax credits. These provisions therefore con-
form both to the theoretical ideal' 54 and to the politically
attainable "second best" proposal. 5
The Clinton Plan would end all attempts to profit by favorable
selection, an endeavor that seriously limits coverage and multi-
plies administrative expense. Victory in this arena is critical to
the effectiveness of the entire reform effort. Section 1422 would
prohibit entities from offering supplemental benefits "pack-
aged" with basic benefits.' 15 Supplemental policies would have
to stand alone and be available to all. 57 Further, section 1402
explicitly would prohibit any practice that has the intent of
favorable selection. 5 Finally, the risk adjustment methodol-
ogy, 59 which can be as broad as the National Health Board
created in section 1501 deems necessary,l 6° would have the
150. Proposed § 1114 provides for various preventative care measures based
on an individual's age. These measures include immunizations for childhood
diseases, tetanus, diphtheria, and influenza; pap smears; cholesterol testing;
and mammograms. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 1114.
151. Id. § 1153(a).
152. Proposed § 1002(a) provides:
In accordance with this Act, each eligible individual (other than
a medicare-eligible individual)-
(1) must enroll in an applicable health plan for the individual,
and
(2) must pay any premium required, consistent with this Act, with
respect to such enrollment.
Id. § 1002(a).
153. Id. § 6104.
154. See supra notes 114-20 for a discussion of the theoretically ideal health
care plan.
155. See supra notes 121-46 for a discussion of the "politically attainable"
plan.
156. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 1422(a).
157. Id. § 1422(b). This allays the concern expressed earlier in this Article,
see supra note 123, that supplemental benefits packaged with basic benefits
could be shaped so as to gain favorable selection. Violations of this provision
would be subject to a $10,000 per violation civil penalty. Clinton Plan, supra
note 147, § 1422(d).
158. Id. § 1402(a)(1).
159. Id. § 1541(b).
160. Id. § 1501(h).
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potential to vitiate selection that would be favorable without
adequate risk adjustment. 61
The number of health care regimes that would receive special
treatment under the Clinton Plan (e.g., veterans, Indians, mili-
tary personnel) 62 means certainly a higher level of administrative
expense, and possibly a higher level of medical expense, than
would a more unified structure. However, the Clinton Plan is
by no means complicated compared to the international norm, 63
and a simpler structure is likely to be politically unattainable in
the short term.
2. Revenue Provisions
a. Non-inclusion of Employer Contributions in Employee
Income
Section 7201 of the Clinton Plan, which revises section 106
of the Code, would limit, effective January 1, 2003, the non-
includibility of employer contributions to health plans to the
value of the comprehensive coverage required.'" The Clinton
Plan defines value for these purposes as the average cost of
providing such coverage to its beneficiaries. 65 Although at first
glance this provision would appear to reduce the incentive to
choose the most cost-effective coverage compared to defining
value in terms of the lowest-cost plan, the proposal, in a
moderately complicated way, would actually preserve the max-
imum incentive effect at the cost of some foregone revenues.
In general, the "family share of premium," as defined by
sections 6101 to 6103, would be twenty percent of the weighted
average premium for health plans offered by the alliance for
that class,'" subject to income discounts 67 and accounting ad-
justments.1 68 Section 1607 defines "voluntary employer contri-
bution" as any payment designed to be used exclusively or
primarily toward the cost of the family share of the premiums
for a health plan. 69 An "excess employer contribution" is the
amount by which the voluntary employer contribution exceeds
the amount of the family share of premium. 70
161. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, §§ 1503(a), (c) & 1505(e).
162. See, e.g., id. § 8001 (uniformed services health plans); §§ 8101-8102
(Veterans); §§ 8201-8207 (federal employees); §§ 8301-8313 (Indians).
163. See WiLLAm A. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE: INTERNA-
TIONAL VARIATIONS IN FINANCING, BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS 47-48 (1991).
164. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 7201(a).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 6103(a).
167.'Id. § 6104(a).
168. Id. § 6104(c).
169. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 1607(e).
170. Id. § 1607(d)(2).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/9
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When the total employer contribution exceeds the cost of the
plan selected, section 1607 of the Clinton Plan would require
that the employer rebate the excess to the employee and classify
the amount rebated as taxable wages. 71 However, this rule would
be modified by the revised Code section 106 so that the differ-
ence in cost between the average cost of the class of coverage
selected and a lower-cost plan would be rebated to the employee
tax free. 72 The availability of tax-free cash as an alternative to
more expensive health care coverage would eliminate the existing
tax subsidy for the selection of costlier coverage.
The Clinton Plan would not repeal section 213, although its
usefulness would be sharply curtailed by mandatory coverage
and limits on out-of-pocket payments. In unusual situations,
this would continue to provide unwarranted subsidies for health
care. For example, an individual enrolled in a network plan
might escape its constraints by forfeiting plan payment. If the
individual's outlay was large enough, the payment would still
qualify for a section 213 deduction.
The new section 106 would not take effect until 2003, in what
is commonly thought to be an accommodation to the demands
of organized labor that the costly coverage that they have
negotiated should not incur an additional tax burden unantici-
pated at the time of the negotiations. 73 Because. section 1607
would not apply at all to collectively bargained plans, 74 excess
coverage in such plans would continue to receive tax subsidies
until 2003.
b. Employer Mandate
Sections 6121 and 6131 state that employers would have to
contribute to the cost of required coverage. 175 Section 6123 would
limit the liability of small employers paying low wages by
granting them a credit against their payment liability. 76 To-
gether, these provisions seek to assure increased employer fi-
nancial support for health care while making the politically
171. Id. § 1607(b)(2)(A).
172. Id. § 7201(a), at revised § 106(d).
173. It is unclear at the conceptual level, but not at the political level, why
this "fairness" argument has carried more weight than it did when applied to
the retroactive tax increases on the wealthy that were part of the 1993 budget
package.
174. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 1607(c).
175. Id. § 6121(a) (covering regional alliance employers); § 6131(a) (covering
corporate alliance employers).
176. Id. § 6123(a)(1), (b)(2). In general, "small employer" is defined as
employing 75 or fewer full-time employees. Id. § 6123(c)(1).
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required, and quite possibly economically desirable, concessions
to small business.
c. Excise Taxes
Section 7111 would increase the tax on cigarettes by $37.50
per thousand, or 75 cents per standard pack.'" While this
proposal would quadruple the existing tax, it is relatively small
given the increases that had been suggested. 78 The increase
proposed for cigars is identical in absolute terms, $37.50, but
much larger in relative terms - a forty-fold increase. 79 The
section would also significantly increase taxes on other tobacco
products and accessories,8 0 and section 7113 would impose an
excise tax on "roll-your-own" tobacco.' The proposal does not
suggest any increase in excise taxes on alcohol. If a consensus
develops that revenue increases beyond those proposed are
needed, one could reasonably expect larger increases in excise
taxes to provide some additional revenue.
d. Recapture of Medicare Part B Subsidies
Extending the logic of partial taxation of social security
benefits to Medicare,8 2 section 7131 would recover from high-
income individuals the excess of 150 percent of the Medicare
Part B monthly actuarial rate for enrollees age 65 or older over
the total monthly premium.' The same section would also
recover from high-income individuals any special benefits ac-
corded by section 6114 to retirees.'8
e. Tax Treatment of Non-profit Health Care Organizations
Section 7601 of the Clinton Plan would restrict the application
of Code section 501(c)(3) to health care providers other than
HMOs that participate in community health care assessment and
planning. 85 To qualify for tax exemption, HMOs would also
have to provide necessary services as determined by assessment
177. Id. § 7111(a)(1).
178. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
179. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 7111(b)(1).
180. E.g., id. § 7111(c) (cigarette papers); § 7111(d) (cigarette tubes); §
7111(e) (smokeless tobacco); § 7111(f) (pipe tobacco).
181. Id. § 7113.
182. See supra note 34 for the rationale behind partial taxation of the
Medicare program.
183. Clinton Plan, supra note 147, § 7131(a), adding new I.R.C. § 59B(a)(1),
(b).
184. Id. § 7131(a), adding new I.R.C. § 59B(a)(2).
185. Id. § 7601(a), adding new I.R.C. § 501(n).
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and planning.'8 Section 7902 makes clear that the new health-
related entities created by the Clinton Plan would not be eligible
for tax-exempt borrowing. 18 7
While these changes fall well short of the "leveling of the
field" called for above, 88 their presence shows how much public
consciousness of the tax exemption of many health care provi-
ders, and its lack of justification, increased during the last half
of 1993. Their presence will assure that tax exemption continues
to be a part of the health care debate, and allows us to hope
that the legislation adopted will move beyond this modest be-
ginning.
VI. CONCLUSION
Health care reform efforts focus on providing universal access
to health care and containing costs. Revision of the tax code is
one avenue, and several changes are warranted. Past efforts
have inappropriately linked the provision of health care with
employment; the linkage should be broken in favor of an
individual mandate. Tax exemptions for so-called "charitable"
hospitals that provide little, if any, health care for the indigent
are unjustifiable. Excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol should
be raised to reflect the true cost of these items to society.
A pragmatic program that Congress can pass must include a
joint individual/employer mandate. To gain the support of small
business and consumers who fear enormous job loss, a system
of dual employee/employer credits should be implemented. Em-
ployer contributions to health care would no longer be deduct-
ible, and employees would no longer be able to exclude the
employer's cost of coverage from gross income. Employers and
individuals would, however, be eligible for tax credits up to the
cost of the lowest-priced minimum plan. The employer tax credit
would vary based on employer size and profitability; the indi-
vidual tax credit would vary based upon income. Such a system
should defuse political opposition from small businesses.
The dual system of credits properly recognizes that medical
expenses include both voluntary and involuntary consumption,
and attempts to tax each different type appropriately. The
Clinton Plan, although a step in the right direction, should
repeal section 213 of the Code in its entirety. Despite its flaws,
the Clinton Plan will place health care financing on a much
186. Id.
187. Id. § 7902(a), adding ne% I.R.C. § 141(b)(6)(C).
188. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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1
sounder foundation than the current health care system, both
in theory and in practice.
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